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The Identity of Turkey: Muslim and
secular
AYLA GO¨L
ABSTRACT This article analyses the rise of political Islam in Turkey in the
context of the AKP’s tenure in power with reference to complex social,
economic, historical and ideational factors. It aims to answer one of the key
questions, which has wider implications for the West and Islamic world: ‘having
experienced the bad and good of the West in secularism and democracy’, as
claimed by Samuel Huntington’s ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis, is Turkey in
transition from a secular to an Islamic state? The article first questions
Turkey’s ‘bridge’ or ‘torn-country’ status and then explains the AKP’s
ambivalent policies towards religious and identity issues in relation to the
increased public visibility of Islam and a ‘performative reflexivity’ of ‘Muslim-
selves’. It concludes that the real issue at stake is not the assumed clash of
secular and Muslim identities but the complex of interdependence between
Islam, secularism and democratisation in Turkey.
Islam has evoked widespread national and international concern as a source
of political tensions since the AK Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi—Justice
and Development Party) came to power in Turkey in November 2002. At the
national level, within less than a year of its second electoral victory in 2007,
the holy trinity of secular establishment—the army, the CHP (Cumhuriyet
Halk Partisi—People’s Republic Party) and the Kemalist elite—accused the
AKP of being ‘a centre of anti-secular activities’ and the Constitutional Court
(Anayasa Mahkemesi) prepared an indictment against the party which would
see it closed down and its leaders banned from politics for violating the
principle of secularism.1 At the international level concerns have been raised
over the impact of the AKP’s closure and its reflection on Turkey’s relations
with the EU and the USA.2 On 30 July 2008 the court announced its verdict
that there was not enough evidence to close down the AKP and instead opted
to cut state funding to the party by half.3 Many argued that the court found a
middle ground between the secular establishment and the government by
taking the international and domestic context of its decision into account. In
particular, the AKP’s pro-EU policies were interpreted as evidence that the
government did not aim to establish an Islamic state based on Islamic law
(Shari’a).4
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For the secularists, however, this decision had a different meaning that
confirmed the engagement of the ruling party in anti-secular activities and
gave a ‘serious warning’ to its leaders. Staunch secularists still fear that the
AKP has a hidden agenda to transform Turkey from a secular to an Islamic
state.5 Since the 2007 election similar debates have occupied the agenda of the
national media, which have speculated about the possibility of Turkey
becoming a ‘second Iran’ or ‘another Malaysia’ within 10 years.6 These
claims reflect two assumptions: Islam is incompatible with secularism and
democracy; and there is a clash of Muslim and secular identities.7 If these
assumptions are accurate, Samuel Huntington’s ‘clash of civilisations’ and
‘torn-country’ theses are validated: the rise of political Islam in Turkey is a
reaction to the failed modernisation based on Kemalist secularism and
Turkey is the subject of an identity crisis between the West and Islam. This
article aims to answer one of the key questions that has wider implications
for the West and the Islamic world: is the AKP government transforming
Turkey from a secular to an Islamic state?
The first section of the article examines Turkey’s Islamic identity and its
problematic status in Western civilisation by engaging with Huntington’s
claims. After evaluating Turkey’s torn-country status, the second section
analyses the AKP’s policies on Islam. It explores historical and sociological
factors that determine the ruling party’s ambivalence towards Islam. The
article concludes by examining the secular establishment’s accusations of the
AKP’s hidden agenda and their implications for the 21st century.
Eurasian bridge or torn country?
Turkey is usually described as a bridge—the so-called bridge theory—
between Europe and Asia, the West and the (Middle) East, or Western and
Islamic civilisations.8 This identification seems logical given the fact that
Turkey is geographically located between Europe and the Middle East.
Turkey as a bridge between two regions is ‘an oft-repeated cliche´’ which has
recently gained an element of relevance.9 Historically Turkey was the first
example of the transition of an Islamic empire to a modern secular nation-
state outside Europe. It is also the first and only Muslim country to have
achieved candidature for EU membership. However, the ongoing debates
about Turkey’s membership in the EU and the AKP’s rise to power have
called into question not only its role as a bridge, but also the nature of
‘Turkish identity’, history and culture in the context of Western secular and
Muslim collective identity.10
Clash of secular and Muslim identities
The AKP called an early election in July 2007 as a result of the clash between
the secular establishment and the government over the announcement of the
presidential candidacy of the former foreign minister, Abdullah Gu¨l. He was
accused of having a hidden Islamist agenda, and his wife wears a headscarf,
which is banned in all public institutions and state buildings—including the
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presidential palace—and is usually regarded as a symbol of political Islam by
the secularists in Turkey.11 The confrontation over Gu¨l’s candidacy initiated
a series of debates between secularists and Islamists.12
On 27 April 2007, before the elections, the Turkish military, by way of a
so-called ‘press release’ on the General Staff’s web page, warned the
government against anti-establishment activities and fundamentalist (irticai)
developments contrary to the basic principles of the Turkish Republic.
Within this context the Turkish armed forces declared itself part of the
secularist debate as ‘an absolute protector of laiklik [laicity]’ and would take
immediate action when necessary.13 There was an ‘e-memorandum’ along the
same lines as the ‘press release’. Secularists accused AKP leaders of seeking a
‘silent’ Islamist revolution since taking power in 2002.14 Analysts claimed
that the secular establishment was concerned about the pro-Islamic policies
of the AKP, which could bring to an end Atatu¨rk’s legacy and his laic
(secular) Turkish republic.15
Within this national context an early general election was held on 22 July
2007. Many analysts speculated that the ruling AKP would win the election
with a majority but hardly anyone predicted a landslide victory with 46.6 %
of votes, except for one polling research agent (KONDA—see Figure 1).16
Many columnists identified the elections of 2007 as the most important event
and turning point in Turkish political history.17 While the AKP supporters
regarded the election result as an unprecedented victory, the Kemalist elite
described it as a political earthquake.18
FIGURE 1. Results of Turkish elections in 2002 and 2007.
Notes: SP: Saadet Partisi—The Felicity Party, the only ‘true Islamist’ party and EU
sceptics; AKP: Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi—Justice and Development Party, a
conservative centre-right party and pro-EU; CHP: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi—
People’s Republic Party, the Kemalist left-wing party and EU sceptics; MHP:
Milliyetci Hareket Partisi—Nationalist Movement Party, the ultra-nationalist party
and EU sceptics.
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Two key events since the AKP’s landslide victory have strengthened the
fears of the government’s sceptics. First, on 28 August 2007, Abdullah Gu¨l
was elevated to the presidency despite the objections of the secular
establishment. Second, the AKP’s decision to remove a decades-long ban on
the wearing of headscarves at universities has been interpreted as
representing the rise of political Islam in Turkey, endangering the previous
bastion of secularism in the Muslim world.19 The origins of these fears
resonated in Huntington’s clash of civilisations thesis.
Redefining civilisational identities
According to Huntington, rather than a ‘bridge’, Turkey had become a ‘torn’
country that ‘has a single predominant culture which places it in one
civilization but its leaders want to shift to another civilization’.20 As
Huntington argues, ‘a bridge . . . is an artificial creation connecting two solid
entities but is part of neither. When Turkey’s leaders term their country a
bridge, they euphemistically confirm that it is torn’.21 He also identifies
Australia, Mexico and Russia as other torn countries, which are identified by
two characteristics:
Their leaders refer to them as a ‘bridge’ between two cultures, and observers
describe them as Janus-faced. ‘Russia looks West—and East’; ‘Turkey: East,
West, which is best?’; ‘Australian nationalism: Divided loyalties’; are typical
headlines highlighting torn country identity problems.22
In Huntington’s opinion, among these states Turkey is ‘the classic torn
country which since the 1920s has been trying to modernize, to Westernize,
and to become part of the West’.23 He argues that the Muslim character of
Turkish society and the Islamic legacy of the country are incompatible with
Westernisation and modernisation. Despite the secular character of the
Turkish state, Huntington places it in the Islamic civilisational realm when
categorising civilisations of the world.24
Based on his essentialist understanding of Islam and unitary conceptualisa-
tion of civilisational identity, Huntington claims that ‘at some point, Turkey
could be ready to give up its frustrating and humiliating role as a beggar
pleading for membership in the West and to resume its much more impressive
and elevated historical role as the principal Islamic interlocutor and
antagonist of the West’.25 According to his claim, Turkey is more likely to
turn back to its Islamic identity after ‘having experienced the bad and good
of the West in secularism and democracy’.26 It seems that, as Casanova
suggests, ‘Huntington would apparently welcome such a transformation
of Turkey from a secular to a Muslim state, if only to fulfil his own
prophecy of the inevitable clash of civilisations’.27 However, Huntington’s
claims in the context of Turkey’s relations with the West are historically
and geopolitically misleading. One can only assume that Huntington must
be referring to the golden age of the Ottoman Empire as the antagonist
of the West. Huntington does not emphasise the fact that the Sublime
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Porte—Bab-i Ali—was ‘geopolitically’ part of the Concert of Europe and
had been developing close relations with the West through war, trade and
diplomacy throughout history.28 Even the historical discourse of the ‘sick
man of Europe’ depicted the Ottoman Empire in Europe not in Asia.
Huntington does not pay attention to the fact that Turkey’s pro-Western
orientation dates back to the Ottoman modernisation policies of the 19th
century and, therefore, should not be considered to have originated in the
establishment of the Turkish Republic under the leadership of Mustafa
Kemal Atatu¨rk in the 1920s.29 Furthermore, since modern Turkey has
already secured its membership in the key military (NATO in 1952) and
cultural (the Council of Europe in 1949) organisations of the West,
Huntington’s claim about Turkey’s ‘humiliating role as a beggar pleading
for membership in the West’ is irreconcilable, unless he is referring to
Turkey’s problematic candidacy for the economic organisation of European
states, the EU.30 In fact, Turkey’s unsettled candidacy within the EU reflects
the political divisions among member states in relation to what the European
project and identity means, not necessarily the Turkish ambivalence to the
West per se. It seems there is a tacit agreement to refer to a ‘prior Christian
heritage’ in relation to the European project.31 It is not Turkey but the
European states that have to decide what this project means and reach an
agreement as to whether they recognise Turkey’s place in Europe or not.
According to Huntington’s thesis, there are at least three requirements of
redefining a torn country’s civilisational identity: ‘First, the political and
economic elite of the country has to be generally supportive of and
enthusiastic about this move. Second, the public has to be at least willing to
acquiesce in the redefinition of identity. Third, the dominant elements of the
host civilisation, in most cases the West, have to be willing to embrace the
convert.’32 If we apply these conditions to current identity politics in Turkey
there are contradictory aspects which refute Huntington’s claims. I turn to
them now.
Pro-Western policies
In relation to Huntington’s first requirement the AKP elite and supporters, as
true Islamists, are expected to be against Turkey’s pro-Western orientation.
However, and despite the party’s religious roots, the AKP leaders have not
challenged Turkey’s pro-Western/EU policies since they took power. If
Huntington were right, they would give up the aim of previous Turkish
governments to become a member of the EU and would redefine Turkey’s
identity as an Islamic state, thus acclaiming its Islamic civilisation. The AKP
government would then have turned its back on the West (USA, EU and
IMF) and broken relations with Israel.33 But, on the contrary, Turkey’s
relations with Israel have peaked and trade between the two countries
doubled under the AKP government between 2002 and 2008.34 The AKP was
the only party that promised to continue political reforms in order to achieve
Turkey’s EU membership and this promise was one of the factors that
brought it victory in the 2007 elections. The AKP’s pro-EU policies also had a
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considerable influence on the Constitutional Court’s decision not to close
down the party a year later.35 Ironically two secular parties—the Kemalist
CHP and the nationalist MHP—not the AKP, used anti-EU discourses against
Turkey’s membership during the 2007 elections (see Figure 1).36 Clearly,
reality and Huntington’s understanding of Turkey’s Western orientation are
contradictory.
Protest meetings
According to the second requirement of Huntington’s torn country claim, the
redefinition of a civilisational identity takes place reluctantly without
protests. However, the political tension between Kemalist secularists and
the AKP government has been highlighted by protest meetings. These rallies—
described as the Republic Protests (Cumhuriyet Mitingleri)—which took
place in Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir between April and May 2007 were the
first example of its kind in Turkish history. There are controversial debates
about which groups—in particular retired army officers and the CHP—were
involved in organising these meetings but millions of people were mobilised
and they were strongly supported by NGOs, in particular women’s
and civil society organisations.37 Some analysts claimed that these street
demonstrations did not reflect the political will and identity of the majority of
Turkish society and that the numbers of participants were exaggerated.38
Despite the secularists’ expectations, however, these rallies did not increase the
numbers of votes for the Kemalist party (CHP) in 2007. Nevertheless, they
represented the voice of secular reactionaries, who believed that secularism is
the route to religious harmony in modernising Turkey. The protest meetings
challenge the second requirement of Huntington’s torn-country claim.
According to Huntington, ‘Turkey may be equally qualified to lead Islam.
But to do so it would have to reject Atatu¨rk’s legacy more thoroughly than
Russia has rejected Lenin’s’.39 Street protests indicate the opposite: many
demonstrators carried pictures of Atatu¨rk and Turkish flags while chanting
slogans to express their determination to protect secularism and republican-
ism as the main principles of Kemalism.40 These rallies demonstrated the
determination of some sections of Turkish society to protect Atatu¨rk’s legacy
and support the country’s secular system against any Islamic agenda.
The support of civilians—particularly women and civil society
organisations—for these protests indicated an increased awareness of the
issue of women’s rights in a secular system. The clash between the secular and
Muslim identity of Turkish women became visible through a loud public
voice.41 The earlier street protests also had a relatively immediate impact on
the political empowerment of women in Turkey: 49 women members of
parliament were elected in 2007. ‘Of the 49, 29 are from the AK Party, and
almost all of them are modern academics, free professionals and business-
women who would constitute the first row of opposition to a system that
would deny them their civil rights and freedoms.’42 The new political
landscape in Turkey gives the impression that the Islamist women will not
concede any of their democratic rights, while secularists will also resist,
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protecting their secular identities and lifestyles from any possible threat of
transforming Turkey into an Islamic state.
Furthermore, the street protests provided a platform for discussion of
secular democracy in a predominantly Muslim country. The demonstrators
strongly criticised the role of the army in Turkish politics as well as the
allegedly hidden Islamic agenda of the AKP government. For secular
demonstrators neither a military coup nor an Islamic state based on Shari’a
was desirable for Turkish democracy.43 They believed that their secular
identity and daily lifestyles, including the freedom to drink alcohol, the
choice for women to obtain driving licences, wearing non-religious clothing—
from mini-skirts to bikinis—and not wearing headscarves, was threatened by
the Islamic lifestyle envisaged by the AKP.44 ‘They presented a picture, which
is young, modern not only urban but also urbane.’45 At the same time there
were slogans that were reminiscent of the 1920s narrative, which reflected the
foundational principles of the Turkish Republic. Interestingly enough, they
used traditional, nationalist and anti-USA slogans.46 When the Turkish
parliament voted to change the constitution to remove the headscarf ban in
universities in February 2008, many demonstrated in Ankara against the
proposed amendments and called for the government’s resignation. They
demonstrated again against the possibility of a military coup in June 2008.47
The continuity of these street demonstrations refutes Huntington’s second
requirement by indicating that there is neither a rejection of Ataturk’s legacy
by Turkish society as a whole nor a reluctant transformation without
protests.
The host civilisation
Huntington’s third requirement of the redefinition of a civilisational identity,
whether the host civilisation is willing to embrace the convert, deserves
careful consideration. When the host civilisation—the West—defines
‘Western civilisation,’ geo-strategically and ideologically there is no obstacle
to accepting Turkey as part of the West, ie as a member of NATO. If Western
civilisation is defined culturally and religiously, the diversity of Turkey, with
its five-times-a-day calls to prayer and Eurasian identity, becomes an
obstacle. Consequently Turkey is seen as not Western enough. This simplified
logic leads us to the view that it belongs to Islamic civilisation.
Unfortunately, Huntington’s thesis does not acknowledge that Turkey’s
place in the Muslim world is also problematic because of its secular character
and, therefore, it is not qualified to lead Islam. So-called ‘true Islamic’ states
such as Iran and Saudi Arabia are ready to lead Islam. Thus, the other host
civilisation—the Islamic world—would not be willing to embrace a redefined
Turkey either.
Additionally, Huntington’s thesis implies that only the Kemalist-oriented
elite wants to be part of the West, while society itself has an Islamic identity
and does not accept such convergence. But a democratically elected AKP
government with 46.6% of votes represents a majority political will that
supports the government’s policies to continue Turkey’s pro-EU orientation.
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If Huntington were right, Turkish voters would opt for anti-EU policies,
which were promoted by other secular and nationalist parties (the CHP and
MHP—see Figure 1). Moreover, as Jung argues, ‘the view from inside Turkey
attests that Huntington’s picture is a mere caricature of Turkey’s political
realities. Certainly, there is—as in all EU member-states—a broad coalition
of EU sceptics’.48 Even if Turkey does not become a member of the EU in the
near future, the possibility of turning itself into an Islamic state, based on
Huntington’s torn-country claim, seems to be a preposterous suggestion
unless its sceptics are right that the AKP has a hidden agenda to Islamise the
state. Therefore the most puzzling aspect of the AKP’s policies is its
ambivalent attitude towards Islam.
The AKP’s ambivalent policies towards Islam
The puzzle that the AKP presents is more complex than Huntington’s thesis
suggests: if the AKP’s domestic and foreign policies have not yet shown any
anti-modernisation and anti-Western orientations, and if the government is
determined more than any previous one to achieve Turkey’s EU membership
how can these policies be compatible with the pro-Islamic roots of the AKP?
The answer lies in its ambivalent attitude towards Islam. Sociologically
Turkey can never abandon Islam per se for two reasons: it is an historical
political marker and an integral part of Turkish cultural identity. In the
Turkish context Islam was placed under the control of state, which is
described as ‘authoritarian’ secularism in the literature.49
With the election results of 2002 and 2007 it became clear that Islam does
not have the negative connotation that it does in the West post-9/11: it is
accepted as one existing social dynamic; and it is not seen as a source of fear
and terror. Therefore the majority of Turks do not regard Islam through
the prism of ‘Islamophobia’, which is increasingly prevalent in the West, as is
an inflated perception of the ‘Islamic threat’.50 This was evident when the CHP
sought to win the election through the politics of fear of Islam but failed to
manipulate Turkish society. Despite its failure at the elections, the CHP
continues to manipulate the increased public visibility of Islam in order to
rally support for its secularist agenda. The next section explains how the
Islamic card has always been part of a political agenda in Turkey.
The Islamic card
The AKP is not the first party to play the ‘Islamic card’ in Turkish politics.
Since 1950 both right-wing and religious parties have used the religious factor
for their own ends. The AKP learned from the mistakes of its predecessors: the
National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi, MSP) under the leadership of
Necmeddin Erbakan in the 1970s; the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, AKP),
again under Erbakan’s leadership, in the 1980s and 1990s; the Virtue Party
(Fazilet Partisi, FP) and the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi, SP) which were
established after the 1997 ‘postmodern’ coup.51 The SP was established to
represent strongly Islamist views in 2001, after the Constitutional Court
AYLA GO¨L
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closed down the Virtue Party for anti-secular activities in the same year.52 All
these parties clearly played the ‘Islamic card’ during election campaigns. In
particular, despite its Islamic views, the SP’s failure in both elections (it won
2.5% of votes in 2002 and 2.3% of votes in 2007) demonstrated that voters
cared more about economic than religious issues.53 The 2007 election was
testimony to the fact that the AKP learned this lesson well. Both Turkish and
Western economists agree that the AKP government has achieved economic
stability, decreased inflation (to almost under 10%), brought economic
growth (at a peak of 9% in 2007), and that foreign investment poured in
between 2002 and 2007.54
As stated earlier, the SP claims to be the only ‘true Islamist’ party. When the
former mayor of Istanbul, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, led the reformist group of
the Welfare/Felicity Party to leave the traditionalists and establish a new
party—the AKP—in August 2001, they decided to have a radical break.55 The
reformists emphasised the idea of a new and clean (‘ak’ literally means both
white and clean in Turkish) leadership determined to eradicate corruption
from the state system. The new leadership used the Islamic card very carefully
by articulating modernist, nationalist, and most recently human rights and
democratic discourses.56 Based on the experience of their predecessors,
they had no option but to work through their ‘ambivalence’ towards
religion.57
The new AKP leadership used three predominant themes during the
election campaigns: reformist, liberal and pluralist in accordance with the
forces of globalisation and market economy.58 In 2002 many voters wanted
to get rid of the old leadership and two-thirds of them had never voted for
Islamist parties before. One of the crucial factors was the economic crisis of
2001, causing voters to try out a new party and its promising leadership.
Many analysts argue that the AKP came to power not only by playing the
democratic game but also by combining the power of democracy with
support for an emerging Muslim bourgeoisie based on ‘green capital’ (yes¸il
sermaye), media and the discourse of reformist nationalism.59 There was an
unexpected consequence of this process. It led to the emergence of a new
socio-cultural group with influential economic power that reflected back
upon traditional, conservative and religious values. This social dynamic
triggered a new cycle within which AKP supporters became aware of their
‘Muslim-selves’. Within this new cycle, the headscarf issue is especially
significant for an understanding of the rise of politically aware Muslim-selves
and the increasing public visibility of Islam in Turkish politics.
The public visibility of Islam
While the AKP introduced new blood into politics and the economy, the
majority of its voters were also enticed by identity issues. For many AKP
voters the party also represents the need for personal freedom to express their
religious identity, which is marginalised and excluded in the public sphere. It
is not surprising that the most controversial headscarf issue was in eighth
place—way below more significant concerns about the economy, corruption
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and joining the EU.60 The AKP was clever enough not to prioritise the
headscarf issue before gaining full power in government, getting the president
elected, and establishing its political and economic credibility. When the
pragmatic AKP leadership stated its intention to remove the headscarf ban it
triggered the next stage of a political crisis between the government and the
secular establishment. The headscarf issue not only acts as a symbol of the
increasing visibility of Islam but also challenges the borders and meanings of
the secular public sphere in Turkish politics. The public visibility of Islam
also has a ‘reflexive’ character as a social condition. According to Turner:
Performative reflexivity is a condition, in which a socio-cultural group, or its
most perceptive members acting representatively, turn, bend or reflect back
upon themselves, upon the relations, actions, symbols, meanings, and codes,
roles, statutes, social structures, ethical and legal rules, and other socio-cultural
components which make up their public ‘selves’.61
I argue that the ‘reflexive’ character of the public visibility of Islam in Turkey
has operated at four levels: first, the control of religion by the state led to the
repression of Islam and suppression of Muslim identity that emphasised
‘Muslim-selves’. On the second level, the focus on Muslim ‘public selves’ was
regarded as ‘reactionary’ for its potential subversion of the secular system by
a holy trinity of Republicans—the army, the CHP and the Kemalists. On the
third level, secular Turks were politically constructed as the new social
reactionaries against the increased public visibility of Islam. Lastly, religious
conservatives reflected this secularist reaction back upon themselves by
increasing their support for the AKP as the true representative of ‘Muslim-
selves’. Consequently it was during the 2002 and 2007 elections that the AKP
supporters carried out a ‘performative reflexivity’ to reinsert their public
‘Muslim-selves’ as a social condition, which contributed towards a landslide
victory as an unexpected outcome and cleared the way for Gu¨l’s presidency.
The question remains as to whether or not this development should be
interpreted as the transformation of Turkey from a secular to an Islamic
state.
For the majority of its supporters the AKP’s tenure in power does not entail
the Islamisation of state institutions. Rather the party aims to represent a
true sense of collective identity (‘Muslim-selves’) and to remove attention
away from state and high politics, which denies the public role of Islam in
society. In this context the ‘fear of Islamisation’ and the alleged hidden
agenda of the AKP seem to be exaggerated. As explained earlier, the AKP used
a populist and positivist nationalist discourse during the elections and the
government, like its predecessors, continues to operate within the structure of
the existing political and economic system.62 The AKP’s policies demonstrate
that the public visibility of Islam is usually worked out through ambivalence,
which allows a crossover between Islam and modernity, and between secular
and religious practices.63 Nonetheless, the paradox that the AKP leaders had
to resolve was related to identity issues because of its ambivalence towards
Islam.
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The AKP had an identity problem in 2002 when it separated from the
strongly Islamist Welfare/Felicity Party. With the elections of 2007 the AKP
moved to the centre right of the political spectrum from its ambivalent
religious basis. In fact, this proved to be its best move. It was the third time in
Turkish political history that a centre-right party had gained such a majority:
The Democrat Party with 57% in 1954; the Justice party with 52% in 1961;
and the AKP with 47% of votes in 2007. Turkish voters have acted decisively
on three occasions, using the ballot box as an ‘opposition’ to the intervention
of the military into politics: the first 1954 election result echoed the end of the
one-party (CHP) regime; the second, after the 1960 coup, showed a
determination for the continuation of the parliamentarian system; while
the third reflected the response to the army’s 27 April e-memorandum.64 The
2007 election result confirmed that the majority regarded the AKP as the right
party to represent Turkey: ‘global, tradesmen, secular, worldly but also
conservative and pious’.65 The secular establishment, however, interprets this
social reflexivity and increased public visibility of Islam as a threat to the
secular character of the Turkish state.
The AKP’s hidden agenda
The AKP’s victory can be explained through the complex causation of specific
social, economic and ideational conditions in Turkey. According to a KONDA
public poll (the same research agency predicted the AKP’s victory with 47%
of votes before the election), two crucial issues influenced voters’ decisions in
2007: economic stability (78.3%) and corruption (38.9%). The next three key
issues concerned security (14.7%), democracy (13.9%) and secularism
(10.3%).66 More favourable views of the AKP government were linked to
the economic growth experienced since 2002.
A Pew Research Center poll also confirms the major role of economic
growth in Turkey’s election results. Its survey revealed that 61% of Turks
believed that the government had made good progress with the economy.
Among 47 countries polled, Turkey shared the top position with Argentina
for this belief. A similar increase in the rate of approval for the government
programme was also evident in other emerging markets, such as Venezuela,
India and China.67
Both Turkish and Western analysts also agree on other multiple causes of
the AKP’s victory: stability in domestic and foreign relations, the 27 April ‘e-
memorandum’ and the crisis over the presidential candidacy, pro-EU
policies, inclusive discourses on Kurdish identity, and avoiding a military
incursion into northern Iraq.68 Voters preferred reform and change,
economic growth and political stability and the AKP was seen as the only
party to deliver such expectations. More importantly, 45%–50% of voters
also find the AKP a reformist party that can challenge the existing status
quo.69 The acid test the AKP leaders have to pass depends on the extent to
which they can realise these expectations. Although there is strong evidence
that the AKP’s policies cannot be interpreted ‘as a deviation from the
country’s modernisation process’, demonstrated by the government’s pro-EU
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political reforms, the secular establishment remains sceptical of the AKP’s
hidden agenda to ‘Islamise’ the state.70 The AKP’s political promises and EU
commitments to different segments of society and the international
community imply that the party can neither afford to adopt any ‘anti’
discourses such as anti-modernisation, anti-West, anti-globalisation, nor to
engage in conflicts with the secular establishment.71
AKP leaders found themselves in another conflict with the secular
establishment over the Constitutional Court’s indictment against their party,
however. Events since August 2007 show that the AKP no longer operates
through ambivalence towards Islam and has lost its credentials as the
defender of democratisation in Turkey. First, the government’s decision to
elevate Gu¨l to the presidency was a radical step.72 According to secularists,
Gu¨l’s ascent to the highest position in Turkey was part of the AKP’s hidden
agenda to Islamise state institutions by stealth.73 The secular establishment
argues that Gu¨l’s presidency puts the mechanism of checks and balances
between secularists and Islamists in danger when the governing party
controls the presidency as well as the prime minister’s post. Second, on 14
July 2008 the prosecution of 86 people, including retired army officers,
businessmen, academics and journalists charged with ‘forming an armed
terror group and plotting to overthrow the Government by force’ indicated a
new political crisis as part of a continuing power struggle between the AKP
and the secular establishment.74 For those who are sceptical about the AKP
government, this series of events calls the government’s dedication to secular
democracy into question.
In relation to the first accusation, in response to sceptics Abdullah Gu¨l
emphasised that the protection of secularism (laiklik) was one of his basic
principles when he was elected. He also emphasised that he would be loyal to
the Turkish constitutional system.75 On an international level another
reassuring statement came from Gu¨l when he addressed the Council of
Europe Parliamentary Assembly on 3 October 2007, the first Turkish
president to do so: the basic principle of the Turkish Republic defined by the
1982 Constitution that ‘Turkey is a democratic, secular and social state
governed by the rule of law’ could not be changed and this principle would be
protected in the new constitution.76 As Gu¨l promises, as long as he stays loyal
to the constitution when making decisions on state affairs and keeps his
religious affairs private he will prove that one can be both Muslim and
secular.
On the second issue, the prosecution of a group of ultra-nationalists, who
allegedly orchestrated a coup against the government, without evidence was
an error of judgement. It gives the impression not only that the civil liberties
of people who adhere firmly to a secular lifestyle and identity are under threat
but also that any anti-government activity will be dealt with in authoritarian
ways. Such an image is not desirable for a modern democratic Turkey.
Nonetheless, the AKP leaders were given a new chance when the
Constitutional Court decided not to close down their party. Their future
policies will prove whether the AKP is a religious party of the past or a
progressive party of the 21st century. They will show their dedication to
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Turkey as a democratic, secular and social state governed by the rule of law,
which guarantees equal rights and civil liberties to all citizens without ethnic,
cultural or religious discrimination. In particular, on the headscarf issue as
the key symbol of the public visibility of Islam, the AKP has to produce a
coherent policy that will guarantee the rights of women irrespective of their
clothing. Women who chose to wear headscarves should not be excluded
from the public sphere or denied educational rights; similarly, secular women
should not have the wearing of them imposed upon them in a functioning
democratic system. Hence, the real issue at stake is not the clash of Islamist
and secularist but the complex interdependency between secularism and
democratisation in a Muslim context.
Implications for the 21st century
‘Having experienced the bad and good of the West in secularism and
democracy’, as claimed by Samuel Huntington, is Turkey in transition from a
secular to an Islamic state under the policies of the AKP government? This
article’s findings indicate a resounding no. The article has sought to
demonstrate that the rise of political Islam in Turkey in the context of the
AKP’s tenure in power needs to be understood within a complexity of social,
economic, historical and ideational factors. Three general conclusions can be
drawn from this analysis. First, Turkey is neither a bridge nor a country torn
between the Western and Islamic civilisations, as claimed by Huntington. In
particular, the key requirements of redefining a torn country’s civilisational
identity—that AKP supporters as true Islamists are expected to be against
Turkey’s pro-Western orientation; that the public should accept this
redefinition reluctantly but without protests; and that the dominant elements
in the host civilisation must be willing to embrace the convert—have been
tested through the Turkish elections of 2002 and 2007. It was concluded that
Huntington’s claims do not correspond with Turkey’s political realities. The
puzzle that the AKP presents is more complex than is presented by
Huntington’s clash of civilisations thesis.
Second, the complexity of the role of Islam in Turkish politics was
analysed through the AKP’s ambivalent attitude towards religion and the
headscarf issue. It was argued that the public visibility of Islam had a
reflexive character as a social condition, in which AKP supporters reinserted
their ‘Muslim-selves’. Hence, Muslim identity is not merely religious, but is
an historical political marker and part of collective identity. Meanwhile, the
AKP’s policies demonstrated that the public visibility of Islam usually
functioned through ambivalence, which allowed a crossover between Islam
and modernity and between secular and religious practices and identities.
Third, therefore, the assumed clash of secular and Muslim identities is
misleading. The real struggle is not between pious and secular Turks. The
fundamental problem that underlies the conflict is the power struggle
between the AKP and the secular establishment during the consolidation of
democracy in Turkey. Based on at least a century or more of experience, the
AKP and the secular establishment have an opportunity to prove that one can
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be both Muslim and secular within a democratic system. The sociological and
historical experience of Turkey shows that secularism and democracy
mutually reinforce each other in a Muslim context.
Under these circumstances the ruling AKP has no option but to protect the
basic principles of secular democracy and, thus, to prove that the allegedly
hidden Islamic agenda of the government is an exaggeration. If the AKP has a
hidden agenda to change the secular democratic character of the state it will
not only jeopardise Turkey’s EU membership but also take the country back
at least a century. Neither the AKP nor the secular establishment can afford to
miss an historical opportunity of promoting the idea that Islam and
secularism are compatible within a democratic system. It is at this juncture, at
the turn of the 21st century, that Turkey can establish its credentials as
Muslim and secular not as a torn country.
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